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Abstract
In this note we formalize certain aspects of measurement (active ob-
servation) process which makes it possible to express in strict terms the
concept of rational behaviour and degree to which logic of the observer
determines what he perceives. This leads to a first-order theory shown to
possess a real-world model: if an observers logic is Boolean, he is bound
to perceive his spacetime as a four-dimensional pseudo-Riemannian mani-
fold of signature 2, with a big bang geometry. These connections between
the type of an observers logic and large-scale structure of the observable
universe generate a testable effect similar to the action of a positive cosmo-
logical constant, imply Haar integration-over-spacetime and also provide
a heuristic limit on the number of matter generations. The result casts
some doubts (arising also from the necessity of renormalization proce-
dures and other difficulties of Gauge-Grassmannian schemes) that classi-
cal mathematics (i.e. the mathematics of the topos of sets) is the natural
mathematics of our world, and offers a new candidate for this role.
PACS: 02.10-v; 98.80.Jk
(1) Introduction. Topos theory [1-6] offers an independent (of the set the-
ory) approach to the foundations of mathematics. Topoi are categories with
set-like objects, function-like arrows and Boolean-like logic algebras. Handling
these generalized sets and functions in a topos may differ from that in classical
mathematics (i.e. the topos Set of sets): there are non-classical versions of
mathematics, each with its non-Boolean version of logic. One possible view on
topoi is this: abstract worlds, universes for mathematical discourse, inhabitants
(researchers) of which may use non-Boolean logics in their reasoning. From
this viewpoint the main business of classical physics is to construct models of
the objective (absolute) universe with a given bivalent Boolean model of the re-
searcher, and choose the most adequate one. In a sense, our task is inverse: with
a given model of the absolute universe, to construct models of the researcher,
and find out how the researchers proper universe changes if his logic is changed.
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Thus, not the universe itself, but rather its differential is what interests us here.
We start by describing the researchers interactions (actions and observations)
with the environment.
(2) Motivations. (a) Action principle (principle I). - The major intuition-
based attribute of actions (elementary influences of the researcher upon the
environment) is that they can be associatively composed (i.e. performed in
sequence), the compositions also being actions, and there is an identity action
(changing nothing). The set of the researchers actions (or effectors), together
with an associative composition, is his motor space. Example: in quantum
theory the observers actions are represented by operators on a linear space
and constitute, together with an associative composition, a semi-group with an
identity (monoid).
(b) Superposition principle (principle II). - The major intuition-based prop-
erty of observations (mental and visual pictures of fragments of reality and
appearance) is their ability to be superposed, with some real (later we shall
generalize the situation for an arbitrary field F) weight factors, assigned by the
observer to each item. Intuitively, they measure the participatory degree of ob-
servations in a particular observational situation. In formal language, there are
two algebraic operations on the set of observations: addition and multiplication
(by reals). The set of the researchers observations (or reflexors), together with
the two operations, is his sensory space. Example: spacetime S of special rel-
ativity can be interpreted as the set of observations (mental and visual images
of events) of an observer: he considers nearby events as superpositions of some
observations taken with some real weight factors (decomposition of an event in
a basis). Since S is a real linear space, there are, indeed, two operations on it -
addition and multiplication by reals.
(c) Quantum principle (principle III). No elementary phenomenon is a phe-
nomenon until it is an observed phenomenon (observations of the researcher
are also his actions). This simply means that obtaining constructive infor-
mation about reality changes its appearance. The quantum principle couples
observations with actions into new entities, called by constructivists states of
knowledge: any rational researcher performs an action in accordance to, and
interprets an observation on the basis of, his particular state of knowledge. It is
said that rational knowledge consists of two fundamental (sensory and motor)
components.
(d) Paradigm. - We shall call the set of a researchers states of knowledge
his paradigm. Observations, then, induce superposition of states of knowledge,
with weight factors (extensive development or accumulation of knowledge), and
actions induce associative composition (intensive development or elevation of
knowledge). Thus we have three operations on the researchers paradigm, which
endows it with an algebraic structure. The linear case of this structure is, of
course, a real linear associative algebra A with an identity. The sensory space
SA then is the additive linear space of the algebra, and the motor space MA
is, one would say, its multiplicative monoid M. However, it is quite difficult to
interpret 0 (the zero of the algebra) as an action. The identity 0 of the algebra
is the identity action, but what is 0? We would rather take M\0 as the motor
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space, but in the former a composition of two actions is not always an action
(i.e. M\0 is not always a monoid), which violates the intuitive notion of action
and, moreover, will not let us define the logic of the researcher. To make a
compromise, we assume that MA = M\0 if the latter is a monoid, otherwise
MA = M. In other words, the motor space is the monoid generated by the set
of non-zero elements of M.
(e) Time. - We employ the constructivistic concept of time: a fundamental
attribute of thought process, the basis to distinguish one entity from another.
No statement on time being a physical property of the universe is made. Con-
structivists describe time as a partial order on the set of states of knowledge. So
do we, slicing the paradigm with a one-form on its sensory space, which partially
orders states of knowledge by the naturally ordered set R of reals. Example:
The proper time of an inertial observer in special relativity is a one-form t,
such that for any event a with components an, (n = 0, 1, 2, 3) in his rest frame,
t(a) = a0.
(f) Metric. - An observerss natural ability to estimate angles and distances
between observations is represented by a metric on his sensory space SA. We
do not force metrics into the scheme because a natural metric is defined auto-
matically, once the proper time of the researcher is known, as follows. Each real
algebra A is completely defined by the structure constant tensor C(ω˜; a, b) on
its additive linear space SA. Tensor C is a multilinear function of two vector
arguments a, b and a one-form argument ω˜. Choosing a particular one-form
t˜ (i. e. a time) on SA makes the tensor C(t˜; a, b)) depend only on the vector
arguments. Thus, if C(ω˜; a, b) is symmetric in a and b, it is, of course, a (proper-
or pseudo-)Euclidean metric on SA.
(g) Absolute universe. - The actual reality principle (principle IV) affirms
that the absolute universe exists and consists of interacting systems. Each sys-
tem is represented by its states. Given all states of a system, it is defined
completely. Some different systems may have the same states (common states).
A system X is a subsystem of a system Y if all states of X are common to X
and Y . If two systems are subsystems of each other, it is natural to consider
them equal. Given two systems X and Y , we can consider a system Z (the
union of X and Y ) whose states are all states of X and all states of Y . For
two systems X and Y with common states there is a system Z (the intersection
of X and Y ) whose states are their common states. A system X that can have
only states that Y cannot, is the complement of Y . The behavior of the onto-
logical pair 〈system, state〉 resembles that of 〈set, element〉 in na¨ıve set theory,
although conceptually they are very different. Two systems interact if states of
one system depend on states of the other one, which is described as a function
in set-theoretic terms. Thus, with systems as sets and interactions as functions,
the category Set serves as a first-order model of the absolute-universe axioms.
(h) Proper universe. - The researchers actions change states of a system i.e.
any action a induces a map X−→X , and we have the influence of the researcher
with the motor space M on a system X as a realization of the monoid M in
the set X , i.e. a map ρ, assigning to each a ∈ M a function fa: X−→X
such that: fa ◦ fb = fa∗b, where ◦ is the operation of map composition, ∗
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is the multiplication in M; f1 is the identity map i.e. f1(x) = x, ∀x ∈X , 1
is the identity of M. A pair (X , ρ), where ρ is a realization of a monoid M
in a set X , is called an M-system. The collection M–Set of all M-systems
describes all the possible influence of a researcher with the motor space M on
the absolute universe. M–Set is a topos in which arrows (X , ρ)−→(Y , δ) are
realization preserving maps f : X−→Y , i.e. f◦fa = ha◦f, fa: X−→X , ha:
Y−→Y , ∀a ∈M. The principle of active comprehension (principle V: the logic
of a researcher is developed in his interaction with the environment) defines the
proper universe as the topos M–Set and assigns to the researcher its logic and
mathematics.
Summary. - We see that only intuition-based concepts, logically prior to
physics, are used here. The technique engaged is extremely simple in the sense
that it is just several steps from the set and category axioms. To compare, the
notion of smooth affine manifold (a starting point for the working physicist) is
far more complicated. Of course, some of the notions seem uncertain, and now,
to improve the situation, we give a technically civilized version of the above
outline.
(3) Technical setup. Let F be a partially ordered field. An F-xenomorph is
the category A[F] of linear algebras over F. Paradigms of an F-xenomorph are
A[F]-objects, his effectors are A[F]-arrows. For a paradigm A: (a) states of
knowledge are elements of the algebra A; (b) a sensory metric is the algebra-A
structure constant tensor C(ω˜; a, b) together with a one-form t˜ on the additive
linear space SA of the algebra A, provided C(t˜; a, b) is symmetric in vector argu-
ments a and b; t˜ is then the sensory time; (c) the sensory space is SA together
with all sensory metrics of the paradigm A; elements of SA are reflexors ; (d)
the motor space is the multiplicative subgroupoid MA of the algebra A, gener-
ated by the set of all non-zero elements of A. A paradigm A is (ir)rational if
MA is (not) a monoid. If A is a rational paradigm and the topos of MA re-
alizations, MA –Set, is (not) Boolean, the paradigm A is (non-)classical. The
topos MA–Set is the proper world of A . A classical paradigm of maximal finite
dimensionality, if it exists, is a classic paradigm.
(4) Remarks (a) We generalized the notion of action. Actions in the old
sense i.e. elements of the monoid MA (or internal actions or normal research)
can be identified with A[F]-arrows term−→ A, where term is the terminal
object of A[F], so the definition is correct. External actions (or extraordinary
research) A −→ B may cause a paradigm change. (b) Irrational paradigms do
not possess any definite logic (if the groupoid MA is not a monoid we cannot
construct the topos MA–Set and therefore define its logic). (c) The field F is
what distinguishes one xenomorph from another, and sometimes we shall call
F the (type of) psychology of the xenomorph, without assigning, of course, the
standard meaning to the term. Here fields are taken together with partial orders
on them, so two different orders on the same field deliver two psychologically
different xenomorphs. (d) A paradigm may have several metrics or it may have
none. (e) The absolute universe is a topos of realizations of a single-element
monoid, therefore it is the proper world of an absolutely objective paradigm
whose motor space contains the identity action only. Informally, any absolutely
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objective researcher is absolutely inert. We shall call this approach monocosm:
the absolute universe is common to all researchers, rational or not, whatever
the phsychology. It is, however, common in a rather inconventional way, since
different researchers will discover different and perhaps mutually inconsistent
laws of nature. We now apply this scheme to the current human parameters
(the psychology is R, logic is Boolean). The conclusion we shall obtain is that
SA is Minkowski space.
(5) Theorem. R-xenomorph has a unique classic paradigm H, of dimension-
ality four, with Lorentzian sensory metric.
Proof. If the logic of the topos MH–Set is Boolean then MH is a group ([6],
p. 121). Therefore H is associative, with an identity and without divisors of
zero. Then 06∈MH (0 has no inverse), and H is isomorphic to the quaternion
algebra [7], and MH∼= SU(2)⊗R
+, (R+ is the multiplicative group of positive
reals). Thus the classic paradigm exists, it is unique and it is four-dimensional.
For a basis en in SH let tm be the components of a one-form t˜ in the dual basis e
n
(the indices run from 0 to 3). Then components Gpq of the metric G (summation
on n is assumed) are Gpq = C(t˜; a, b) = C(tne
n; ep, eq) = tnC(e
n; ep, eq) = tnC
n
pq
, where Cnpq are the components of C. They are easily found in the basis of the




t0 t1 t2 t3
t1 −t0 −t3 t2
t2 t3 −t0 −t1
t3 −t2 t1 −t0

 .
G must be symmetric. Non-trivial symmetry demands t1 = −t1, t2 =
−t2, t3 = −t3 which yields t1 = t2 = t3 = 0. Thus H has a unique metric of
signature 2, generated by a unique (up to scalar factor) sensory time (t0, 0, 0, 0),
which concludes the proof.
(6) Notes (a) Defining viewpoints of xenomorph as inertial frames, we ob-
tain a sensory-motor version of special relativity. In fact, though the one-form
t˜ plays the role of psychological time (no such thing in special relativity), once
t˜ generates a metric, the latter in turn generates time in its standard sense. If
we ignore the motor structure of the paradigm, four-dimensionality and Lorentz
metric become a mystery, which is the case in standard physics. It is easily
checked that besides the classic paradigm, which is four-dimensional, there are
two (and only two) non-trivial classical paradigms of R-xenomorph, R (one-
dimensional algebra of reals) and C (two-dimensional real algebra of complex
numbers), both subalgebras of H. Informally, physics of the classic paradigm
is a superposition of three versions of Boolean physics of different dimensional-
ities, which may account for the existence of three generations of matter. (b)
Spacetime. Since the objective absolute universe Set is a Boolean topos, we
can separate a Boolean part - the most objective, in a sense, in any rational
paradigm A. Obviously, it is the set exp (A) of invertible elements of the algebra
A: they constitute a group. For any finite-dimensional rational paradigm of R-
xenomorph (decoherent paradigm), its set of invertible elements is a Lie group,
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so it has a natural topology. The sensory space SA is the tangent space at the
identity of exp (A). If A has a sensory metric G, then it can be naturally con-
tinued over exp (A) (say, by left translations), i.e. exp (A) possesses a natural
(pseudo- or proper-)Riemannian structure, so it can be considered as spacetime
of objective or physical events of the paradigm A. The states of knowledge that
are not in exp (A) may be called subjective or nonphysical events (effectors,
reflexors). Composition of physical effectors is always a physical effector; com-
position of nonphysical effectors may result in a physical effector (A \ exp (A)
is not always closed under composition). Although always Hausdorff, exp (A)
may have non-trivial global topology. The principle of maximal coupling to
reality (principle VI) assigns to every decoherent paradigm its spacetime. (c)
Classic paradigm H. We denote spacetime the classic paradigm by Ω. It has
a cylindrical topology S3⊗R (S3 is three-sphere), and for the natural metric,
looks like a four-dimensional funnel opening up into the future. The scheme
gives a universe open in time, with a compact space-like hypersurface resem-
bling models with positive cosmological constant or some other kind of dark
energy. Since Ω receives a locally compact (non-Abelian) Lie group structure,
the corresponding Haar measure should be used in all relevant integration. The
classic paradigm is rather objective: it contains a single non-physical reflexor
0, and no non-physical effectors. (d) Ω-mathematics. The theorem offers the
mathematics of the topos Ω–Set as the real-world math. Boolean though, it has
an unpleasant property: the axiom of choice fails in Ω–Set ([6], p. 300). This
means, for example, that it will be pretty tough to prove countable additivity of
the Lebesgue measure, without which the strict form of modern analysis is, of
course, impossible, which, in turn, makes the basic technique of quantum theory
invalid. We have a substitution, the axiom of determinateness, that in many
cases works better, for example, it does not create the difficulties associated
with the algebra of cardinals [8]. This may or may not be of interest to physi-
cists in general, but in any case, the task of rewriting QFT in the new languge
looks now very difficult even if there is hope to clean some of the mess [9]. (e) If
A is a non-trivial Grassmann algebra, the paradigm is called a Grassmannian
(supersymmetric) paradigm of R-xenomorph. Since A has divisors of zero, MA
cannot be a group. Therefore, the logic of a Grassmannian paradigm is always
non-Boolean, and mathematics is always non-classical.
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